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Fellowship of Reconciliation Fellowship of Reconciliation Task Force on Latin America and the Caribbean 2017 Mission St. #305, San Francisco, CA 94110 Tel: (415) 495-6334, Fax: (415) 495-5628, E-mail: forlatam@igc.apc.org

One Flag, One Territory
International Delegation to Panama, July 27-August 3, 1997

Introduction
Counterdrug center: Needed for whom?
Opposition to Counterdrug Center
The Social Context: Colón
The Kunas
Contamination and Cleanup of US Bases
         --Citizen participation
         --Inviting the Public to the table
         --Finding the real public
         --Legal issues
Prospects for Future Solidarity
Recommendations
Appendix
         --Technical Issues
         --Glossary; Participants
         --Itinerary
         --Other Websites of Interest

Introduction
From July 27 to August 3, 1997, the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the Episcopal Church of Panama sponsored an international delegation to Panama. The delegation sought to learn from a range of actors in Panama about the status of US military bases, the talks to maintain a military presence in Panama after 1999, and the environmental problems generated by military activities in Panama. We also aimed to express support for those Panamanians working for the full implementation of the Panama Canal Treaties, specifically the treaty provisions for troop withdrawal and environmental clean-up of US bases.

Our group was diverse, including an Episcopal Church bishop, an environmental engineer, a coordinator of a peace and justice center in Puerto Rico, African-American veterans of peace activism in the United States, a Dutch human rights analyst working in Bolivia, a Panamanian church educator, an advisor to communities dealing with military base clean-ups, an environmental attorney, and others.

Our visit to Panama came at a critical time in the debate of these issues. Less than two weeks before, Panama and Washington announced the opening of formal bilateral negotiations for a "multinational counter-drug center" to be centered on Howard Air Base in Panama after 1999. The negotiations came nearly two years after Presidents Bill Clinton and Ernesto Pérez Balladares announced a period of informal talks on the future of the US military presence in Panama. Although the military bases in Panama receive little public attention in the United States, they present a set of extremely sensitive issues to Panamanians, which media there scrutinize closely.

The environmental conditions of US military bases and firing ranges have also been the subject of public debate and controversy in Panama. In early July 1997, the Fellowship of Reconciliation issued a press release, based on statements by Pentagon documents and contractors, declaring that the US military had tested chemical weapons and depleted uranium in Panama. The statements caused a political firestorm in Panama, forcing the US ambassador and Panamanian Foreign Minister to respond. In addition, the Panamanian government sponsored a two-day public conference on environmental conditions on US bases, coinciding with the first two days of our delegation, drawing more attention to the issue. These environmental concerns raise broader issues about the US-Panama relationship, including Panamanian sovereignty and what will become of the military lands transferring to Panama.

This report describes our experiences, what we witnessed and learned, and offers analysis and recommendations based on those experiences. We believe that what is occurring in Panama now provides a kind of test case for the hemisphere, and is of utmost importance to efforts for demilitarization and environmental and weapons clean-up.

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The Multinational Counter-Drug Center in Panama: Needed For Whom?
The nucleus of the multinational counter-drug center" (MCC) proposed for Panama has actually operated there since 1992, at the Joint Air Operations Center on Howard Air Base. Synthesizing data gathered from ground-based and air-based radar, the center tracks unauthorized aircraft throughout South America. This data has been used primarily by the Colombian and Peruvian armed forces to shoot down or force down the suspect aircraft. Military officers and pilots from Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil present at Howard collaborate with the surveillance effort.

The MCC proposed by President Pérez Balladares to the Rio Group of Nations in 1995 would expand Latin American participation in the center, and give it a mandate beyond 1999, when the Canal Treaties require US troops to leave Panama. Both US and Panamanian officials have said repeatedly that the center would require a US military presence to run the center, airstrip and associated equipment; press accounts report an agreement in principle on 2,000-2,500 US troops after 1999. Although Washington and Panama have begun negotiations for the MCC without other countries at the table, the Mexican military is reportedly also interested in participating.

Former president Nicolás Ardito Barletta, who directs the governmental Interoceanic Region Authority (ARI), outlined three reasons for the MCC to us. First, "the center will be useful because the [narcotics] problem affects the whole hemisphere," said Dr. Barletta. He added that the center contributes to "damage control... until we find a better solution to the demand problem." Second, the center counteracts Panama's image as a haven for drug trafficking. Least important, according to Dr. Barletta, is the center's contribution to the Panamanian economy.

During a tour of Howard Air Base, Treaty Implementation Center Director Colonel David Hunt told us that "We're probably going to have 15 or 18 countries eventually that would like to be part of this.. and where are they going to live?" As we passed troops with guns advancing on their stomachs during a military exercise, Col. Hunt told us that housing for military personnel is currently a negotiation issue.

The US defines "counter-drug" activities to be virtually any military operation in the region. For example, Col. Hunt spoke of road- building exercises by the National Guard: "They may build a school, a road that provides entry to an area that, not only we have people that live out there, but suspected drug labs, so the roads benefit the country, benefit our engineers and in part it can be considered counter-drug operations as well."

But Col. Hunt made clear that the key element of the US military presence in Panama is the cheaper access its airstrip offers to the Andean countries. "You can put the air operations center that we have here in Bangkok, Thailand and it would work just as well... For the aircraft, they could work out of any base in the States... It's technically feasible; there are better ways to do it than" outside Panama, said Col. Hunt. Although he asserted that none of the aircraft in Panama engage in actual operations or interdiction, we saw F-16s-typically offensive equipment-on the airstrip at Howard.

The plan to create an international counter-drug center comes at a very opportune moment for the Pentagon: the headquarters of the US Southern Command and of US Army South are moving from Panama to Florida and Puerto Rico, respectively. This situation forces military strategists to think about reinforcing and restructuring its physical presence and operational capacity in Panama, since Panama offers the best geographic location and its leaders appear to be politically willing.

This reinforcement may be accomplished in two ways: First, reinforcing intelligence or surveillance. The military bases in Panama are likely to have a greater mandate than before to organize the control of air space in Latin America. The second area of reinforcement is in increasing the training capacity of Latin American forces in order to police the continent. Since the School of the Americas, in Fort Benning, Georgia, is likely to be closed in the foreseeable future, Panama offers an important space to fill the training needs of international troops, with participation by both armed forces and police units ("combined forces") from several Latin American countries and under the Pentagon's leadership. In other words, the MCC could lend itself to perpetuating the School of the Americas in a new guise.

These changes in the physical presence of the Southern Command are ostensibly aimed at strengthening the fight against drug trafficking. Nevertheless, the failures of the military counter-drug strategy and the systematic denials of this situation by the Pentagon demonstrate a lack of realism that is hard to believe in military strategists with long experience.

The supposed victory over drug trafficking in the air bridge between Peru and Colombia/Ecuador is a good example. The demonstrable results of this triumph are an increase in alternative trafficking routes, especially riverine and sea routes; greater involvement of Brazilian groups (with their own international Mafia contacts); a relative strengthening of Mexican trafficking lines; and increased use of Colombian routes through Central America and the Caribbean. The US military has had to announce plans for stepped up maritime surveillance. In military terms, the current strategy has led to a less controllable situation.

For the countries of the Andean region, the possible consequences of the projected changes (of which the extension of military bases in Panama is only part) are: increased participation by the Armed Forces in internal control (for example, the fight against drug trafficking); greater capacities and scope for police repression; greater risk of creating and maintaining repressive structures (both operational and in surveillance), parallel to the State and with great levels of international coordination. More broadly, this may bring collateral effects such as greater struggles for power within the executive branches of the Andean countries, higher levels of violence and human rights violations, and broadened international mandates for use of national resources and land.

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Opposition to the Counter-Drug Center
Sentiments against the proposed counter-drug center run deep in Panama, ranging from student groups to religious figures to former president Dr. Jorge Illueca, who most recently served as Panama's ambassador to the UN. Jesuit priest Nestor Jaén called drug trafficking simply "an excuse to intervene here," and a protest at the Foreign Ministry burned an effigy of President Pérez Balladares.

In a meeting with us, Dr. Illueca said that the "people in power are not all loyal to our history." He said that the MCC is against both Panama's constitution and the canal treaties, and that its discussion should be postponed until after the United Nations special session on drug trafficking in 1998.

The delegation also met with members of the Panama Sovereignty Front (FREPASO) and Organizations Against the Military Bases (OCBAM) in an open discussion of the current counter-drug center negotiations, toxic cleanup on the bases, and the status of anti- base organizing in Panama and US.

FREPASO is a coalition primarily of academics who are against the negotiations between US and Panama on the counter-drug center; OCBAM is a coalition composed of primarily by the National Coordinating Body for Human Rights in Panama (COPODEHUPA), the construction workers union, and the Revolutionary Student Federation. A Panamanian participant observed that in terms of youth involvement, given the make-up that night, the approach of the groups left something to be desired. Many of the folks who were there do not normally work with each other due to political differences, and the delegation offered them an opportunity to renew their relationships.

Since the delegation's visit to Panama, Dr. Illueca has proposed a broad front to oppose the MCC. "Faced with the threat to territorial integrity implied by the counter-drug center," Dr. Illueca declared, "I believe it is of extraordinary importance that there be a national front that goes beyond all sectarian ideology, taking as its symbol the interests of the country. In this way, in the year 2000 and the twenty-first century we will have a single flag, not two as apparently this center attempts, which we reject with all our strength and reason."

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A Visit to Colón
Colón, Panama's second largest city, lies on the Northern (Atlantic) end of the Panama Canal, some 50 miles north of Panama City. As the primary Atlantic Ocean entry point for ships that transit the Canal, Colón is both geostrategically and economically important to the life of the Panamanian nation. Yet the city, with some 80,000 people, has an unemployment rate exceeding 45%. The population is predominantly made up of extremely poor Afro-Panamanians, Mestizos and Native people. Open sewage and large areas of squalid, deteriorated housing dominate the city landscape. Colón was also hard hit by the 1989 US military attack on Panama.

Our delegation took a brief tour of the city (including a walking tour of a waterfront community near the Free Trade Zone of Colón), and met with Pedro Maclao, a Colón leader of COPODEHUPA, a grassroots Panamanian human rights and social justice organization that, among other work, is vigorously advocating compensation from the United States for Panamanian victims of the invasion. Pedro described a number of popular movements in Colón, including the struggle for housing rights, employment, and benefit from the ongoing government expansion and economic development of the Free Trade Zone, which plans to tear down large numbers of housing units without providing alternative housing for displaced residents. A coalition of residents is especially struggling against the government's virtual giveaway (25 cents per square meter) of lands currently used by the public for a seaside park, in order to develop condominiums.

Despite the conditions of terrible poverty, squalor, and government neglect, we experienced the energy, cultural vitality, and genuine hospitality of the people whom we met and those who greeted us on our brief stay in the town.

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The Kunas and Military Bases
In the 1930s, indigenous Kunas began to work on the U.S. military bases in Panama under a verbal agreement made between the U.S. military and the Kunas, with no mediation from the Panamanian government. The agreement allowed the Kunas to work for limited periods, the intention of the "Sailas" who negotiated the agreement being to maintain their national integrity. Breaking up the work into temporary periods allowed the workers to return to the "comarca" rather than remain working on the bases.

The Kuna base employees worked in the kitchens, beginning their day at 3:00 a.m. and finishing at 10:00 p.m., with a salary of $10 monthly. In 1950 this salary increased to $18 a month. In 1970 the Sailas proposed a minimum wage of $1.60 an hour. The Kuna employees have participated directly in military maneuvers, regardless of the conditions. Today they suffer a variety of health problems, with no labor benefits such as social security, retirement, unemployment insurance, or vacations.

Kuna base workers are divided on the question of their future, with some prepared to work for the US military in Puerto Rico, while others seek severance pay that would benefit their families and communities. But since the closure of the military bases was first announced for 1999 and the process of converting the bases began, Kuna workers have been laid off with no severance pay, contrary to international laws that govern labor standards and to what Southern Command officials told us.

In 1987 the COOSMUKY cooperative was formed with 250 members. It was begun as a savings coop, but currently is a multiple service cooperative. The number of members in the coop has dropped because of unemployment to 105, the number of employees who remain on the bases until 1999. For the future, the COOSMUKY cooperative plans to promote cooperativism and agriculture and finance small businesses.

The situation of the Kuna workers on the military bases needs support and advice regarding labor rights. On the one hand, they do not belong to labor organizations, because the agreements are made by the Kuna General Congress and the verbal agreement between the military and the "Sailas" is law. On the other hand we wonder: is the verbal agreement between the military and the Kuna "Sailas" right?

Solidarity in support of the Kuna workers could include: calling the attention of the U.S. Congress and international community to the labor conditions of the Kuna base workers; learning about the experiences of indigenous workers in the Philippines and other places with similar situations; and bringing the case to international forums such as the United Nations and the International Labor Organization.

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Contamination and Cleanup of US Bases in Panama
The FOR delegation attended a two-day conference on July 28- 29, "Environmental Aspects of the Transfers," sponsored by Panama's Foreign Ministry, Natural Resources Institute, and the Interoceanic Region Authority (ARI), which is charged with administering the transferred military areas. The conference itself was held at former military buildings and drew intense media attention. It also provoked official US discomfort: the week before the conference, the Foreign Ministry and Natural Resources Institute received calls from US officials (including from agencies which fund Panamanian environmental programs) asking why they were involved in the conference and questioning the credentials of several US presenters and participants. But Panamanian officials expressed their frustration at the lack of information about environmental conditions on the bases.

Many of the sites which have already reverted and many due to be returned are contaminated with the accumulated toxic wastes of up to six decades of U.S. military operations. During World War II the US had more than 100 military sites in Panama. The US Army Tropic Test Center has also used Panama as a testing ground for weapons since 1964. Some of the dangerous elements remaining on the lands to be turned over to Panama include underground spent fuel tanks which have leaked, polychlorate bythenals (PCBs) from transformers, asbestos, lead from pipes, unexploded ordnance, mines, rockets, grenades from the firing ranges and chemical weapons dumps. Over the course of the years 21 people have been killed by explosives and many others injured. While in Panama we met with Andrés Romero who is partially disabled from a bomb found near his home in the village of Huile.

The FOR, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund and the Panamanian human rights group COPODEHUPA released a 93-page legal brief in July 1997 which describes the international laws and domestic precedents which obligate Washington to follow through on environmental clean-up in Panama, even beyond the official withdrawal at the end of 1999. While in Panama, the three groups which sponsored the report held a well-attended press conference.

In the meantime, the US has yet to offer a meaningful reply to a Memorandum of Understanding proposed in April 1997 by the Panamanian government. The MOU calls for the establishment of a jointly run Environmental Center which would conduct continued disclosure of the toxic situation and undertake cleanup at the sites beyond the year 2000.

Public Participation
On December 31, 1999, as stated in the Canal Treaties between the United States and Panama, all land within the jurisdiction of the United States military will revert to the government of Panama. Obviously, in 28 months time, fifty-plus years of environmental damage cannot all be cleaned up. However the people and government of Panama - as well as those in the United States - have an opportunity to begin a process that will continue long after the military has handed US bases back to the Panamanian people.

In the United States many groups and individuals have worked hard over the years to ensure that citizens can participate in the cleanup decision-making process at military facilities across the country. This approach has worked for various reasons, but first and foremost because the Department of Defense (DoD) has begun to realize that when citizens and communities are invited in to the cleanup process at a substantive level early and often, it makes for better decisions. After all, it is citizens and communities that will have to live with the long- term consequences of cleanups after the military is gone. The United States also has laws and regulations to ensure citizens are a part of the process and that environmental remediation meets certain standards.

The country and citizens of Panama are entitled to no less. However, US EPA has no jurisdiction overseas and Panama itself has few environmental regulations or enforcement procedures. Likewise, US public participation policy in environmental cleanup decisions has not so far been applied outside of the United States. Nonetheless, there are specific lessons and models that can be used by citizens, non- governmental groups and communities within Panama.

Inviting The Public To The Table
In many ways, communities in Panama are more suited to the process of public participation than many communities within the United States. However, active efforts must be made to include them in the process.

The two-day conference on environmental aspects of the base transfers, organized by the Interoceanic Region Authority (ARI), was ARI's first attempt to bring together people and organizations interested and involved in environmental cleanup of unexploded ordnance, underground storage tanks, etc. on US military installations transferring to Panama. Unfortunately, community members and NGO's were not very well represented at this event. The US military, on the other hand, was present in force (with four-color handouts and a video of forest lands shown without narration).

A portion of the conference was devoted to environmental and socioeconomic issues, including a discussion of the public's role in the environmental cleanup of military facilities. Specific topics included human health and safety and the possible role the public may play in the cleanup decision-making process. This is typically the area in which the public shows interest, but again, this discussion lacked diverse representation.

Discussion centered for the most part around how the public could have an impact on the cleanup of US military facilities in Panama. There also seemed to be a fairly strong disjuncture regarding the relationship of the environment to the health and safety of citizens and residents-many people equate the environment with trees and animals and feel more attention was being given to that. One workshop proposed that the Health Ministry implement both health studies and a comprehensive education program about the relationship between the environment and human health. Other topics included the use of the media, economic impacts, political and legislative issues.

Finding The Real Public
Fortunately, we were able to visit communities and talk with people who live next to bombing ranges or border on existing military facilities. One of these communities, a collective of several neighborhoods, is located on Arraiján, a former US military area.

This 12-year-old community of 3,000 people is organized into 14 neighborhoods, each neighborhood having its own president and executive committee. They have also formed various committees (water, sewer, education, agriculture, electrical, health, waste disposal, international relations, etc.) to deal with the specific issues of concern.

This community has a long-term vision for their area and the will to implement that vision. They are already aware of the risks they face from possible military contamination on their property. They share information about the various idiosyncrasies they find in their neighborhoods (e.g. water that appears to be causing rashes, the location of unexploded ordnance, and the particular types of contamination, such as lead or chemicals they might be experiencing).

This particular community is ideally situated to address the complex issues of environmental cleanup due to US military presence. They have already requested that drinking wells be tested; they want to start an education outreach campaign about unexploded ordnance; they are looking at what sort of cleanup standards they want as a community.

In the United States there is national legislation in place for the formation of Restoration Advisory Boards (RABs) at domestic military sites. The RAB is made up of community members, the polluting federal agency and regulators. The role of the RAB is to advise the military on their cleanup decisions. In most cases RABs are started from scratch. A membership selection process is settled upon, by-laws are written, and community members begin to educate themselves on the intricacies of environmental contamination and cleanup at military installations. Often sub-committees are formed to deal with more complex aspects of the cleanup process.

Where we in the United States are just beginning this process (instituted in 1993), some communities in Panama, with community collectives or work cooperatives, have an infrastructure that goes back over a decade. Though they will need to become familiar with the nuances of military environmental contamination and cleanup, this is essentially a community project. Additionally, these communities do not expect too much cooperation from their own government or the United States. They appear to be self-determined and willing to prioritize their own cleanup needs. Having laid out the design for their neighborhoods, built a school and farmed their land, this organized community was very aware of the link between public health and safety and the environment.

The ARI conference fulfilled its mission of introducing people to the process of property transfer and environmental cleanup. However, it did not succeed in substantively involving the affected public. Moreover, there was relatively little NGO participation. Our subsequent trips to individual communities provided local insights into the every day problems of military environmental contamination. These visits were also an important initial step in establishing a long-term working relationship with communities in Panama dealing with the US military environmental legacy.

Legal Issues Involved in Base Cleanup
The plenary sessions of the ARI conference included little discussion of legal issues, although a representative of the US military (Colonel Michael Debow) remarked that the US is in full compliance with its legal obligations; a representative of Panama (Dr. Nicolás Ardito Barletta) expressed concern that stringent environmental regulations could frighten away investments in the converted areas; and Panamanian legislator Oydén Ortega remarked that the obligation of the US to clean up the base areas is clearly and unequivocally expressed in the applicable treaty provisions.

A working group on legal issues included a presentation by Neil Popovic, who outlined the legal arguments put forward in the legal briefing paper he co-authored with the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund.* He focused on the arguments that: (1) the US may not unilaterally downgrade its treaty-based obligation to clean up all hazards to human life, health or safety as is practicable; (2) international law requires the US to clean up the base areas, provide complete, accurate and timely information about environmental hazards, and provide compensation; and (3) the Panamanian government may not bargain away the environmental human rights of its people.

The briefing paper, which was shared with Panamanian government representatives and other participants in the conference (in addition to its formal, public release on July 30) presents an extensive review and analysis of legal issues raised by environmental contamination on and associated with US miliary bases in Panama. Under the Canal Treaty and its implementing agreements, the US and Panama agreed to consult and cooperate with each other to ensure due regard for protection of the environment. In addition, the US specifically agreed to take all measures to ensure insofar as may be practicable that every hazard to human life, health and safety is removed from US military sites on the date such sites are returned to the government of Panama.

Although the US has undertaken some clean up activities, the environmental contamination associated with the US military presence in Panama remains a threat to there, especially as US military facilities are converted to civilian use. Problems such as soil and ground water contamination, lead-based paint, and unexploded ordnance pose substantial hazards. DOD's unilateral downgrading of its cleanup obligation to incorporate a cost-benefit analysis, and other considerations that are not part of the treaty language, is inconsistent with the treaties and contrary to the rules of international law. International law embodies a range of norms and standards that impose obligations on the US government to provide information about the nature and extent of contamination, to clean up the mess and to provide compensation to victims.

A comparison between the handling of domestic base closures (where the US government must comply with domestic environmental laws) and overseas base closures (where the government appears to disregard domestic standards) reveals a double standard that violates international non-discrimination norms. In addition, the human impact of the contamination, and the failure to provide complete and accurate information suggest violations of the human rights of the people of Panama, including the right to life, health, personal security, safe and healthy food and water, safe and adequate housing, self-determination (including sovereignty over natural resources), non-discrimination, and the rights of future generations. The situation also implicates the right to information, public participation, and the right to a remedy.

A lawyer with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rodrigo Noriega) and other working group participants commented that the Panamanian government should produce a document along the lines of the briefing paper for use in its negotiations with the US government. The working group also addressed the potential for a US-Panama memorandum of understanding on cleanup issues, and it addressed the lack of domestic environmental standards in Panama.

Government officials appeared receptive to -- even anxious for -- recommendations from members of the FOR delegation on legal and other technical issues. They also expressed their intention to employ a US law firm to represent their interests in Washington, DC.

Meetings with representatives of nongovernmental organizations suggested an interest in legal issues, but also a lack of familiarity with the applicable standards. Several NGO representatives expressed discomfort with the notion of continuing cleanup obligations of the US beyond the end of 1999 because they view such obligations as an opening for the US to maintain a military presence in Panama beyond December 31, 1999.

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Prospects for Future Solidarity Work
The FOR Panama Campaign has identified two major issues in its solidarity work: 1) to defeat the anti-narcotics military initiative and any plan which would mean further US troop presence beyond 2000 (including the US Army Tropic Test Center, which has formally proposed staying); and 2) ensuring that the US underwrites cleanup of the toxics it has left behind on the military use areas.

While both these goals are mandated by the Panama Canal Treaties and represent important steps toward relations of mutual respect between the United States and Panama and the region, Panamanians respond to them in diverse ways. Panamanians across the political spectrum and from all classes and backgrounds consistently demand a full clean-up of toxics and explosives generated by US military activities. Sometimes these demands are focused on the need for the Panamanian government to make demands on the United States, which makes the issue sensitive for Panamanian officials.

The presence of US troops and other militaries in Panama is much more divisive. Polls show that most Panamanians favor keeping US military bases after 1999. Yet when citizens are asked whether they favor keeping bases if there is no economic compensation (rent), the number in favor drops below 40 percent. Among the political class, especially the PRD, the potential threat of United States retaliation for not negotiating a continued troop presence is more palpable. It was the PRD that was ousted from power and thousands of whose members were imprisoned or exiled during the 1989 invasion. Opposition parties, for their part, often oppose the MCC simply because it is perceived as a PRD project, but many parties' criticisms have focused on the lack of information about the proposed center.

Moreover, Panamanians' responses to military troop withdrawal are not static. US declarations that there will be no payment to Panama for a continued military presence, revelations about environmental contamination of the bases and ranges, news of Colombian paramilitary incursions across the Panamanian border in the Darién, and legal experts' declarations that keeping US troops after 1999 would violate the Neutrality Treaty all affect the calculus of public and institutional opinion about the proposed counter-drug center.

On the US side, pro-base forces such as Senator Jesse Helms have complained that President Clinton and the State Department have not given sufficient attention to the Panama base issue. (One Helms staff report claimed Clinton had spent less than an hour on the issue, including a 1995 meeting with President Pérez Balladares.)

US media coverage to date of the historic transition in Panama has been minimal, mostly presenting the official view of the Panamanian and the US governments. The tone of most pieces, such as in the New York Times and Washington Post, has been uncritical of the Pentagon's aims, giving a slant of "Yankee don't go home!" or casting doubt on Panama's ability to manage the canal on its own. Over the summer, some mainstream US media (Christian Science Monitor, Reuters, New York Daily News) have published stories about contamination on the bases and chemical weapons tests in Panama.

The scant and establishment-oriented attention to Panama has favored quiet attempts to violate the Treaties' promises. This means that solidarity work in the United States must begin by raising awareness about the US bases in Panama and its implications for US-Latin American relations, international drug policy, the Chemical Weapons Convention, base clean-up in other countries, and international efforts at demilitarization.

US citizens are also in a good position to help link Panamanians working to convert the bases in Panama to civilian use with communities in the United States and other countries who are struggling with the same challenges. Sharing technical information on base cleanup, united political action to close US bases, and conveying experiences of community efforts each can contribute to all such communities' struggles.

In our meeting with two anti-base coalitions, Panamanians proposed that their groups and the FOR agree to work together in a more coordinated fashion. Concrete steps are to be "cemented" in the form of a joint understanding or agreement between the groups represented in the meeting that night.

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Recommendations
Regarding the proposed multi-national counter-drug center, we recommend:

1. That the provisions of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties for the complete military withdrawal of the United States from Panama by December 31, 1999 be faithfully honored.

2. That Panama and the United States promptly cancel further negotiations for a post-1999 US troop presence, and pursue means for the full economic conversion of US bases (including Howard Air Base) to civilian uses that will benefit Panama's poor majority.

Regarding public participation in base clean-up, we recommend:

1. Follow-up with information needed by specific communities (e.g. maps, UXO manuals, information regarding specific types of contamination and their effects).

2. Work with the ARI to support their efforts to develop relationships with communities such as Arraiján.

3. Link citizens in Panama to those working on similar issues in Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and other nations.

4. Train community collectives to do simple Community Impact Statements.

5. Follow up with US EPA to see what options we have in Panama to see that cleanup is assured.

Regarding technical solutions for base clean-up, we recommend:

1. While Panama and the US pursue questions about base cleanup and treaty compliance through legal and diplomatic avenues, there is reason to believe that Panama may be able to achieve many of its objectives through existing technical forums. However, in order to fully avail itself of this opportunity, Panama must first define, in the clearest terms, all of its environmental expectations.

2. The Panamanian government should review the cleanup standards utilized by the Defense Department (DoD), U.S. EPA, various U.S. states, various European governments, the World Health Organization, and others.

3. Panama should also define its information requirements from the United States. A critical element of this process will be the submission of an environmental baseline survey which identifies any locations on a base where hazardous substances have been handled, stored, or disposed. This will serve as the baseline for identifying potential or known contaminated sites. By requiring the submission of this document at least one year prior to reversion, Panama will be establishing a process that allows the United States and Panama sufficient time to decide what sites need further investigation, what sites must be cleaned up, and what sites are free of contamination and are so appropriate for immediate reuse.

4. SouthCom has requested $8 million for environmental projects over the next two years. DoD is currently assembling its budget for FY1999-FY2000. If Panama determines that the existing funding target is insufficient for the US to meet its treaty obligations, it is essential that DoD, the State Department, the White House, and the Congress be advised of any projected shortfall. This notification should occur as soon as possible, but no later than this fall, while DoD and the Congress still have time to act. Of course, Congress or DoD could always make additional funds available if they so choose. However, it will be far easier for Panama to have its environmental expectations met if DoD requests and obtains funds during the normal budget process.

Regarding Kuna base workers, to counteract unemployment among the military base workers, we recommend support for the following immediate actions proposed by the COOSMUKY coop:

1. Severance pay to the workers equal to that accorded to other workers.

2. That they be allowed to work on the base clean-up process, since they know and manage military munitions and equipment.

3. That some of the kitchen equipment be left to them in order to set up food businesses - cafeterias, restaurants - an area in which they have much experience.

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Appendix
TECHNICAL ISSUES
Nicholas Morgan

Several decades of industrial activities have left their mark on every base in Panama, yet the US military has not fully identified the extent of the contamination. Furthermore, The US military is not planning on fully cleaning up all known contaminated sites. The Panama Canal Treaty requires the U.S. to clean up its bases prior to reversion. Judging by the US military's existing environmental program, the Southern Command (SouthCom) is not likely to do so unless Panama presses the issue.

While Panama pursues legal and political remedies through appropriate diplomatic channels, there is a great deal of technical coordination that can be pursued to ensure that the US military complies with the Treaty. For example, representatives from Panama and the United States routinely meet to discuss site specific issues under the terms of the Joint Commission on the Environment (JCE). Using these and other existing vehicles for communication, substantial progress can be made to ensure that all contamination is identified and cleaned up prior to reversion.

The government-sponsored conference on environmental base cleanup marked a milestone in Panama's program for addressing the reversion process. Most notable was the strong solidarity demonstrated among the concerned federal agencies, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Health Ministry, the Natural Resources Institute, the Interoceanic Regional Authority, and many others.

The transfers of Arraiján Tank Farm and portions of the Empire Range confirms that the United States does not intend to fully identify all toxic contamination that is present, and certainly not shown that it intends to clean up all contamination that is present on reverting installations.

At the core of any cleanup program are a number of technical issues that are framed by subjective policy decisions. Essential questions, such as the adequacy of SouthCom's existing cleanup programs, the acceptability of leaving underground storage tanks in place without soil testing, the acceptability of leaving transformers in place with PCB's above 500 part per million, and the acceptable level of residual soil and groundwater contamination, are all policy decisions that should be made at the highest levels of the government. These policy decisions, however, can only be made with technical input from staff.

Such cleanup will also promote the domestic environmental management industry. With the assessment and cleanup of contaminated sites becoming an increasing priority throughout Central and South America, Panama could use the experience with the bases to position itself as the regional leader in environmental remediation technologies.

Panama has yet to define all of the details of its expectations in regards to the type and content of documents that it would like submitted, or cleanup actions it would like SouthCom to conduct. In general, the US military has chosen which documents to submit, what studies to perform, and which cleanups to perform. This is due, in part, to the extensive policies and procedures that the US military has unilaterally developed and is implementing.

In April 1997 Panama submitted a Memorandum of Understanding to clarify environmental expectations. While very valuable, there are also a number of significant, technically-based policy statements that Panama can unilaterally issue regarding soil and groundwater cleanup levels, PCBs, and underground tank requirements. Once issued, these policies will not only assist the US military in understanding what actions they must conduct at each reverting base, but they will serve as the benchmarks against which overall compliance with the treaty can be measured.

It is impossible to define what threat a site poses to humans, nature, or future development, unless the nature and extent of contamination is known. Furthermore, while it may be technically feasible to clean up most contaminated soil, it is not technically feasible to clean up all of the contaminated groundwater and bombing ranges prior to 1999. In order to greatly improve Panama's opportunity to negotiate for cleanup of such long-term problems, it is essential that Panama and the United States identify all such issues prior to reversion.

Once identified, sites can be prioritized so that Panama can ensure its needs are addressed. Priorities can be set based on which sites pose the greatest threat to humans, which sensitive ecosystems are threatened, or which sites jeopardize essential reuse plans, or any combination of these and other factors.

The US EPA estimates that nearly half of all underground tanks can be expected to leak. Without an aggressive detection and cleanup program, Panama may well find widespread contamination at the tanks being left behind by the US military. Furthermore, the US military does not follow a consistent closure program for the tanks it is leaving behind. In some cases, tanks are filled with sand, in other cases, they are left empty. If Panama defines its expectations in a timely manner, DoD may be able to obtain funds in order to comply with Panama's expectations. Once established, the underground tank policy will serve as the benchmark against which all past and future US military underground tank actions can be evaluated.

Abbreviations and Acronyms
ARI - Interoceanic Region Authority
COOSMUKY - Cooperative of Kuna military base workers
COPODEHUPA - Grassroots Coordinating Committee for Panamanian
Human Rights
DOD - US Department of Defense
EPA - US Environmental Protection Agency
FOR - Fellowship of Reconciliation
FREPASO - Panama Sovereignty Front
MCC - Multinational Counter-drug Center
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization
OCBAM - Organizations Against Military Bases
PCBs - Polychlorate Bythenals
PRD - Revolutioary Democratic Party
RAB - Restoration Advisory Board
UXO - Unexploded Ordnance

Delegation participants

Kevin Casas - Program Officer, Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress, San José, Costa Rica

Wanda Colón Cortez - Director, Caribbean Project for Justice and Peace, San Juan Puerto Rico

Aimeé Houghton - Career Pro, San Francisco, California

Harold Jordan - National Youth and Militarism Program Coordinator, American Friends Service Committee, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

John Lindsay-Poland - Director, FOR Task Force on Latin America and the Caribbean, San Francisco, California

Nick Morgan - independent environmental base cleanup consultant, Berkeley, California

Andrés Mares Muro - Co-director, Fellowship of Reconciliation Panama Campaign, San Francisco, California

Bishop James Ottley, Anglican Observer at the United Nations, New York, New York

Neil Popovic, Earth Justice/Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, San Francisco, California

Clayton Ramey, FOR Disarmament Program Coordinator, Nyack, New York

Theo Roncken, Researcher, Bolivian Center for Documentation and Research, Cochabamba, Bolivia

Walter Smith, Education Officer, Episcopal Church of Panama, Panama City, Panama

Itinerary of the delegation in Panama:
Visits:
Howard Air Base
Empire Range (reverted portion)
City of Colón

Meetings:
Panamanian Government: Dr. Nicolás Ardito Barletta, Director, and Ing. Sayda de Grimaldo, Environmental Section Director, of Interoceanic Region Authority (ARI). Dr. Rodrigo Noriega, Environmental Advisor to the Foreign Minister

United States Government: Ambassador William Hughes; John Peter Higgins, US Secretary of the Joint Commission on the Environment; Colonel David Bruening, US Army; Amy Bliss, US Information Service. Colonel David Hunt, USAF, Director, DoD Treaty Implemetation Center, Albrook Air Station.

Non-Governmental: Dr. Jorge Illueca, former president of the United Nations General Assembly, former president of Panama. Board of Directors of the Reverted Communities of Arraiján. Lois and Andrea Mendoza, women representing the Indigenous Secretariat of Panama. Vicente Archibald, Adalberto Rodríguez, Service for Peace and Justice (SERPAJ-Panamá). Father Conrado Sanjur, President of Grassroots Coordinating Committee for Panamanian Human Rights (COPODEHUPA); Pedro MacLao, director of Colón chapter of COPODEHUPA. Marco Gandásegui, Director, Center for Latin American Studies (CELA). Dr. Humberto Ricord, jurist. Mir Rodríguez, environmental activist, Defensa Ambiental. Andrés Romero, community of Huile, survivor of munitions accident. McDonnell Kantule, president, COOSMUKY. Father Nestor Jaén, Coordinator of the Jesuit community of Panama.

Other Websites of interest:
La Prensa (from Panama, in Spanish): www.prensa.com

Foro Nacionalista de Panamá (bilingual): http://www.pk2000.com/FNP

To take action and for further information, contact FOR's Task Force on Latin America and the Caribbean/Panama Campaign at the address below: