Panama Update Archives

Back to Archive Listing

Number 19, Spring 1997

Panamá Update Fellowship of Reconciliation Task Force on Latin America and the Caribbean 2017 Mission St. #305, San Francisco, CA 94110 Tel: (415) 495-6334, Fax: (415) 495-5628, E-mail: forlatam@igc.apc.org

Troop Talks Lack "Transparency"

The United States and Panama are expected to announce soon the start of formal negotiations to maintain a U.S. military presence in the proposed "counter-drug center" in Panama after 1999. U.S. officials and conservatives have turned up the heat on Panama since January on a host of fronts, from the U.S. Senate to The Washington Times.

According to a Panamanian official, the United States and Panama have reached broad agreement to maintain U.S. troops in Howard Air Base, as well as parts of Rodman Naval Station and Fort Kobbe, Galeta Island, and some buildings in Corozal, all under the umbrella of the proposed "multinational counter-drug center" that will monitor unauthorized aircraft and maritime traffic in the region.

But the official said that talks are stuck on whether the director of the center will be a civilian, as Panama proposes, or a military officer, which is reportedly what Washington wants, and on whether the referendum required to ratify the agreement would be tied to a constitutional reform that would allow re-election of President Ernesto Pérez Balladares. The official said that talks have focused on other issues instead, such as potential trade benefits for Panama.

Undersecretary of the Army Joseph Reeder, who chairs the Panama Canal Commission’s board of directors, told a Congressional committee that the talks have been "informal, extensive, successive and going forward," and that "there will be significant events" in April or May.

But formal "negotiations" may only await the right political moment to be made public. It is best "not to risk a negotiation that has the probability of ending in failure," President Pérez Balladares said in a letter published in March. All the actors apparently agree that an agreement must be reached this year, to allow for a referendum in Panama before campaigning for the 1999 elections begins in earnest next year.

The United States, however, has announced a "Plan B." If there is no agreement for a counter-drug center with U.S. troops in Panama after 1999, the United States will establish a similar center in Cayo Hueso, Florida, outgoing Southern Command chief General Wesley Clark announced on April 17. Such a center could cost more to set up but be cheaper to operate than the surveillance center at Howard Air Base, an assistant to drug czar Barry McCaffrey told Panamá Update.

Panamanians Speak Out

Panamanian activists, clergy and political representatives, for their part, have vigorously opposed negotiations for a continued military presence. Bishop Samuel Ruiz, of Chiapas, Mexico, called the U.S. bases a "symbol of death against the project of life of God’s Kingdom" in February, and said that "the conversion of the bases into ‘multilateral counter-drug centers’ implies their continuation." Bishop Ruiz was joined in his statement by Bishops Pedro Casaldáliga of Brazil and Rigoberto Hermes of Bolivia, and by 40 other clergy and activists from all over the world.

Panama’s Jesuit community also expressed its "concern that the U.S. bases in Panama could be turning into a U.S. covert operation that surprises us with unwanted results." The Jesuits noted that "in all negotiations between the strong and the weak, the latter always loses."

Academic and student groups in favor of full military withdrawal joined human rights and labor organizations in early April to form a broad front to work toward that end. "The only true reason for Panama’s governing oligarchy to turn over some military bases to the United States," declared Panamanian Nationalist Forum, one of the coalition’s leading groups, "is so that the U.S. military may intervene in Panama to keep the oligarchy in power, as happened in 1925, 1989, and other times."

The Arias Foundation, founded by Nobel Laureate Oscar Arias, also sponsored the formation of a national chapter of Central American Dialogue, which warned of the "disguised military presence" in the proposed counter-drug center. Former National Police chief Ebrahim Asvat told the Dialogue’s founding meeting that "any kind of negotiation with a U.S. military component beyond the year 2000 contradicts the demilitarization process" which Panama has undertaken with the abolition of its army. Former vice-president and Christian Democrat leader Ricardo Arias Calderón noted that the presence of bases and 10,000 U.S. soldiers "did not prevent us from falling into the hands of a narco-dictatorship," in reference to the Manuel Noriega regime of the 1980s.

The ruling Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) continues to be divided over the question of the presence of U.S. troops. One PRD activist, Virgilio Periñan, interrupted a ceremony organized by the U.S. Southern Command in February, shouting "Yankee go home!" The division may be one reason why the PRD government has taken its time negotiating a deal with Washington.

Washington’s "Potential Enemy"

Helms Staff Report Sets Conditions for Bases Reveals ‘Informal Understanding’ In February, a staff member of Senator Jesse Helms’ Foreign Relations Committee, Gina Marie Hatheway, issued a 35-page report on the status of military base negotiations between the United States and Panama. Based on interviews with 45 officials from both countries, the report presents a fascinating -- and in some cases inside -- look at how one of the Panama Canal Treaties’ key provisions is being renegotiated -- and at the obstacles to that negotiation. We reprint key excerpts below. On the "informal agreement" to keep U.S. bases in Panama: The late Foreign Minister Gabriel Lewis, who headed the Panamanian delegation, stated his support for an agreement to keep US forces in Panama... After the Clinton administration rejected the idea of any kind of economic compensation, Lewis suggested the Multilateral Counter-drug Center (MCC) to US Government officials as a ‘political umbrella’ for US forces to stay in Panama... He referred to it as an anchor for negotiations, a political umbrella, or even a cloak for a continued US military presence... An informal understanding was reached between Lewis and key US officials in Panama for the US military to potentially keep Howard AFB, Rodman Naval Station and Fort Kobbe (HOROKO)...Lewis, a businessman, was very open with Americans about the military presence and made it clear that he wanted to do everything possible to keep such a presence. Both US and Panamanians commented that sometimes Lewis may have forgotten which side he represented. On how the terms for the proposed counter-drug center were set: On November 30, 1996, in response to the Government of Panama’s request for Washington’s views of the MCC and how it would work, Ambassador Negroponte gave Panama a basic outline of the US Government’s interpretation of the proposed MCC. [Emphasis added] On support for the "counter-drug center": The MCC has not gained much support from Latin American leaders, and many Panamanians, including the opposition political parties, remain skeptical of the idea. None of the political parties seemed enthusiastic about the MCC nor were they willing to support this idea.... Former Vice President Guillermo ‘Billy’ Ford does not feel very comfortable with the MCC idea because it currently lacks definition, and it could make Panama a potential target for retaliation by narco-terrorists... The Arnulfistas feel that the MCC does not make much sense. One member referred to it as a smoke screen to keep US forces in Panama. The longer the negotiation takes, the more vocal and effective the opposition to a continued US military presence in Panama becomes... If an agreement is ever to be reached, it must be achieved by the summer of 1997. On what kind of military presence to negotiate, the report says that ten conditions "must be met" for an agreement on the MCC, including: SouthCom must either retain or at least have access to Howard AFB, Rodman Naval Station, Fort Kobbe, Fort Sherman, Galeta Island, two communication buildings at Corozal and if needed some housing facilities at Fort Clayton; SouthCom must retain command/control authority; The military component of the MCC must be commanded by the US military; The question of a continued US military presence in Panama must be presented to the Panamanian people as a clean "yes/no" referendum. Without the minimum criteria through a MCC agreement... the negotiation simply is not worth pursuing... Panamanian key players involved in the negotiation suggested that they do not foresee more than 400-500 US troops stationed at the MCC. They feel that this number is all that is needed to work on counter-narcotics efforts. U.S. officials have made it clear that they require several thousand troops in Panama... to successfully combat drugs in the region and to pursue other important missions. [emphasis added] On U.S. policy toward paying rent for bases: Then Defense Secretary William Perry made it clear to Hughes that no compensation of any kind would be provided for the continued use of the military installations citing three general reasons: (1) the United States does not pay rent for bases and it did not want to set a precedent; (2) compensation is hard to justify when the United States is closing other bases both within the United States and overseas; and (3) the DoD budget in general is "under attack" (i.e. budgetary constraints). Senior Administration officials also rejected the idea of any kind of benefit package, such as the extension of tax credits for investment, or entry into NAFTA for Panama. On popular support for the U.S. bases: The Balladares Administration is convinced that without some kind of direct compensation for the continued presence of the US military in Panama, the referendum will not be approved. Polls which indicate that some 75% of the Panamanians want the US military to stay, also show that less than 40% of the Panamanians would want the United States to stay without any kind of compensation.

The bid to keep U.S. troops in Panama has renewed official U.S. interest in relations with the country. Defense Secretary William Cohen said in his first press conference on January 31 that "it will be important that we have some sort of residual presence in Panama." His statement was followed three weeks later by the release of a staff report from Jesse Helms’ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, calling on the United States to maintain seven military facilities in Panama after 1999 and chiding the Clinton administration for not moving more quickly on the issue [see "Helms Staff Report Sets Conditions for Bases"].

It was Panama’s award of a port privatization contract to a Hong Kong conglomerate, leaving the U.S. corporate giant Bechtel a losing bidder, that most infuriated both Democrats and Republicans, however. The conglomerate, Hutchison Port Holdings, is the largest port developer in the world, and is partly owned by mainland China. Ambassador William Hughes immediately accused Panama of a "lack of transparency" in a public letter -- ironically, issued the same day as Washington certified Panama’s cooperation in the drug war. Hughes, elaborating on his complaint, said that his embassy "has become the first line of defense to serve the interests of U.S. companies overseas."

One Clinton administration official told the Panamanian daily La Prensa that if Pérez Balladares does not submit a new anti-corruption law to the Assembly this year, it runs a "serious risk" of having its anti-drug efforts "decertified" by Washington next year.

The Washington Times ran a front-page banner story March 19 alleging foul play in the port contract. The Times quoted without comment one analyst saying that "in China, like in so many Asian countries, money buys influence." The same day as the Times story, a House committee holding hearings on Panama Canal operations quizzed canal officials about the Hutchison contract.

"I wouldn’t want to see the special relationship [between Panama and the United States] threatened by the entrance of a third country that is a former adversary of the United States," said Representative Gene Taylor (R-MS). "That was one of the things that worried the opponents of the Canal Treaties, that a potential enemy would end up running the Canal." Taylor and five of his colleagues went to Panama the following week and were assured that Panama would offer U.S. companies another chance at the ports with further privatization contracts.

An irritated President Pérez Balladares said that Democrats and Republicans have transferred their fight over mainland China and its financial involvement in U.S. politics to Panama. Gerardo González, a leader of the ruling Revolutionary Democratic Party, asserted that the United States is pressuring Panama to give up part of Balboa Port or Rodman Naval Station. In fact, Foreign Minister Alberto Arias announced March 19 that part of Rodman or Balboa Port may be used for the proposed counter-drug center to train regional forces in maritime anti-drug operations.

To reinforce the case for a future military presence, the U.S. press widely reported a March poll taken in the Panama City area that showed 72% supporting a continued U.S. military presence. These figures in hand, a Washington Post on April 9 editorial said that "Americans defer more to Panama’s nationalism than do most Panamanians." (Apparently forgetting the Reagan administration’s violent destabilization campaigns in Central America, the Post editorial said that "Washington’s determination to deal with sovereign Latin states as equals [as demonstrated in the canal treaties] became the principle underpinning of American foreign policy in the region.")

But the poll in Panama also revealed contradictory attitudes, which the media filtered out. Asked whether they would accept a military presence if the United States pays no economic compensation to Panama, 63.9% said no. On the other hand, 78% also favored the creation of a "counter-drug center" currently under negotiation between Panama and Washington, although it would include a military presence and U.S. officials have said they will not pay compensation.

Sources: La Prensa 3/17, 3/20, 3/24, 4/4, 4/11, 4/13, 4/18/97; El Panamá América 3/9/97; Washington Times 3/19/97; declaration by International Christian Secretariat of Solidarity with Latin America, 2/6/97; statement by the Jesuits of Panama, 3/17/97; interview with ONDCP personnel, 2/28/97; CELA, Canal de Panamá Hoy 3/97.