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Colombia Update, October 2002

Overcoming the Logic of War in Colombia

An interview with Ana Teresa Bernal

Ana Teresa Bernal is executive director of the National Network of Initiatives Against War and for Peace (Redepaz), a coalition of grassroots peace efforts. She also served as civil society representative in peace negotiations between the government and guerrillas from 1999 until the talks collapsed in February. FOR interviewed her in Bogotá in August, the day after President Alvaro Uribe suspended constitutional guarantees.

FOR: How did you become involved in working for peace?

ATB: I was born in Bogotá, and when I was a teenager I was in a leftist group. An event that marked my life terribly was the takeover of the Palace of Justice [in 1985.]The cries of the people inside marked me. I dedicated myself to building a country with a logic different from war, a logic of living together, to working on building peace. It was a year when an avalanche of mud killed thousands of people [in Colombia]. I had a child, and my mother died. So, an intense year.

We decided to go from protesting to proposing. The movement for life was formed in 1985, and in 1992 we began organizing peace weeks. The Mandate for Peace began in 1996 when children voted for peace, which was broadened in 1997 to all the population, with ten million people voting. It was so important that it legitimized the negotiation process with the [guerrilla organizations] FARC and ELN. I was a participant in the National Council for Peace, created by a powerful citizen initiative that included the government and civil society. I was a delegate in negotiations with the FARC and ELN in the issue working group.

We also worked on regional working groups for peace, which have an educational agenda for peace, building it by territories. There are more than 100 peace territories, and the experience is different in each one. Some have constituent municipal assemblies, with the idea that sovereignty lies with the people. For example, in Mogotes, [in the Department of] Santander, they revoked the mayor’s mandate and organized a municipal constituent assembly. They were able to stop the war in the municipality. In other towns they are mobilizing the society to put a brake on violence and establish better relationships. We are working on the idea of peace territories:spaces in schools, hospitals, parks that are sacred. We are even talking about children’s bodies as peace territories. There are also open meetings for peace, organized by the people or by the municipal council.

FOR: Opinion polls in Colombia say that many people want a negotiated solution to the war, but on the other hand President Uribe was elected on a platform of a “tough hand.”How do you explain this discrepancy?

ATB: The people voted for Uribe because they thought that he could resolve the armed conflict quickly. It was a discussion of security, his whole platform and speeches centered on security. But the people are not clear what methods he will use. Uribe talks of negotiations, but the problem is when a negotiated solution will occur. When?After the havoc of war?That is a damaging logic, and we fear that the consequences will be terrible.

FOR: There are many peace actions - the march by 20,000 women on July 25, the Congress for Peace and Country in May, etc. Why do these actions not get translated into a de-escalation of the conflict?

ATB: Neither the government nor the guerrilla recognizes the importance of civil society’s participation. In 1997, the votes of ten million people were not enough to make them recognize it. The guerrillas think that peace mobilizations are manipulated by the government. We have to keep insisting on social participation. We have to work tirelessly and put the most important issues into debate. Everything is being hidden behind the problem of security. But insecurity comes not only from battles. The largest part of the violence is social, in family violence, for example. This tells us something. The country has very serious problems that must be addressed.

FOR: What are the elements for building peace, what are the first steps?

ATB: We have several points for an agenda that has to do with social, agrarian, and political reforms, and human rights. These are issues we need to deal with independently of the armed conflict. We don’t have to wait for dialogue. It is a social debt we have.

FOR: What is the role of the international community in this process?

ATB: Its role is fundamental. All our steps should be with the knowledge of the international community. In terms of human rights, the international community should be observers, should be critical and neutral toward all the groups:the paramilitaries, the guerrillas and the state. The international community is the only one that can see and denounce.

With the United Nations, only the government can invite the UN to participate. A point of entry could be a humanitarian accord [for exchanges of prisoners and respect for civilians]. The Government believes that the peace process should be first, and has said they may negotiate with the paramilitaries. The guerrilla does not recognize the paramilitaries as independent of the State. There is a problem.

FOR: Do you believe the paramilitaries are independent of the State?

ATB: The paras have had connections with the armed forces, but they do not depend on the armed forces. Not all of them are tied to each other. They have a level of independence. And because they commit violations, these groups must submit to justice. But they are not fighting against the State, so they have nothing to discuss with the State [in negotiations]:they are defending it.

FOR: Why did the negotiations of 1999-2002 fail?

ATB: A large reason was that none of the parties could overcome the logic of war with a political logic. The negotiations never focused on anything more than procedure, on whether planes would fly over [the demilitarized zone] or not. It was a logic of war and it dealt with war’s actions. So the process dissolved.

There were important things, public hearings. I was on the issues committee, which dealt with employment, displaced people, distribution of income, illicit crops. There were extraordinary proposals, but they stayed on the shelf. They were never brought to the negotiation table, and the commercial media never emphasized those hearings.

 

 

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©2002 Fellowship of Reconciliation