Contesting Patriotism
by the Post-9/11 Peace Movement in the United
States
By Patrick
G. Coy*, Gregory M. Maney, and Lynne M. Woehrle**
(This article was first published
in Peace Review: A Transnational Quarterly, Volume 14, Number
4, 2003, p. 463-470. It is posted here with the kind permission
of the editor. The study is part of a larger project analyzing
the discourse of US peace organizations across three wars: The
Gulf War, the 9/11 period, and the Iraq War. Other journal publications
and a book will eventually follow.)
* Patrick Coy
served on the FOR national council from 1986-1993, and 1998-2002.
He was the national council
chairperson from 1990-1992.
** The authors
contributed equally to the research and writing.
In the days following the tragic events of September the 11th, U.S. peace
movement organizations (PMOs) found themselves operating in a difficult
political climate. For the government, the mainstream media, and
the general public, “citizen,” “patriot” and “retaliation” merged
into a single “American” identity so that many felt
that the nation and its way of life were at risk, and that war
was an appropriate response to the “new threat.” Since
then, the mistaken hyperbole of an “everything has changed” approach
to understanding September 11th has permeated most discussions
of the event. While the extent of change is exaggerated, it is
nonetheless true that there were significant shifts in the political
landscape in both domestic and foreign policy. In addition, relatively
simplistic understandings of patriotism gained even more credence
than usual in the U. S.,
and policy dissent was denigrated and more easily branded as unpatriotic.
A long range and comparative approach to
history shows that many of these political developments are somewhat
predictable and relatively
common when a state comes under attack on its home soil. But due
partly to the United States’ placement as the world’s
lone military superpower and its imperial policies in a globalized
economy, the attacks of September 11, 2001 also deeply influenced
how Americans understand themselves and perceive their relationships
to the rest of the world. For example, the false insularity that
most Americans had long taken for granted was suddenly threatened. The
Bush administration easily exploited this, rallying support for
a policy of a permanent war economy, aggressive military retaliation,
preemptive attacks abroad and civil liberty suppression at home. And
at the core was a call to intensely nationalistic patriotism.
In a televised speech to a Joint Session
of Congress, President Bush stated, “Tonight we are a country awakened to danger
and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and
anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or
bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.” In
the same speech, the President praised Republicans and Democrats
alike for singing “God Bless America” on
the steps of the Capitol along with approving $40 billion to “rebuild
our communities and meet the needs of our military.”
The general public responded to the events
of 9/11 with intense national pride. According to a study conducted
after 9/11 by the
National Opinion Research Center, 97% of respondents agreed “they
would rather be Americans than citizens of any other country.” The
same study also offers evidence that elites successfully used this
heightened nationalism to increase their own legitimacy. In the
wake of the fiasco of the 2000 presidential election, public confidence
in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government had dropped to
13.5%. In the first survey taken after 9/11, great confidence in
the Executive Branch had risen to 51.5%. Confidence in the military
nearly doubled from 39.7% prior to 9/11 to 77.4% afterwards. Though
always contentious, there was less room than ever for critical
thinking about domestic and foreign policy decisions made by the
power elites. Patriotism was over-simplified, as the “other” was
made stark and dangerous.
Given these changes, we set out to discover
how American peace groups responded discursively to the challenges
that 9/11 posed
to their activism. We collected and coded official statements
about September 11, 2001, the so-called War on Terrorism in Afghanistan
and elsewhere, and the “Patriot Act,” from nine organizations:
the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC); the Black Radical
Congress (BRC); the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR); the New
York Labor Coalition Against the War (NYLAW); Pax Christi (PaxC);
Peace Action (PA); the War Resister’s League (WRL); Women’s
Action for New Directions (WAND); and the Women’s International
League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). Most of the 56 statements
collected were issued between September 11, 2001 and December
31, 2001. We defined “official statements” as press
and media releases, printed statements, editorials, and public
calls to action from an organization’s national office, issued
in the name of the organization. These statements create a partial
historical record of an organization’s words and actions
and demonstrate how organizations contribute to discursive processes
that shape the construction of patriotism.
Peace movement organizations (PMOs) have at least two options
in responding to the use of widely and deeply resonant cultural
materials by power elites to secure mass consent to war (what Antonio
Gramsci termed hegemony). On the one hand, they can create
counter-cultures that directly challenge hegemonic concepts and
practices. Norms that encourage deference to the state are questioned,
resistance is celebrated, and new practices are lived out. Alternatively,
groups can take a more complicated and subtler approach by employing
cultural materials from the political mainstream that are likely
to increase both by-stander support and sympathetic media coverage
by modifying, reclaiming, or re-writing those materials. In this
way, knowledge that is familiar and resonates with a wide range
of potential and actual constituents is turned to new purposes:
the creation of oppositional knowledge that challenges government
actions and supports social and political change. This oppositional
knowledge may place pressure upon targeted elites to meet movement
demands. We refer to this work by PMOs of co-opting symbols and
meanings as “harnessing hegemony.”
Our study suggests that peace activists
both challenged hegemony and harnessed hegemony in the months
following the September 11
attacks. For instance, one sign at a demonstration to protest
the war in Afghanistan declared
that “Patriots are Idiots: Matriarchy Now,” while another
read, “Loyalty to the Country Always; Loyalty to the Government
When It Deserves It.” The first directly challenges the
conformist nationalist identity, suggesting that it uncritically
accepts the status quo system of hierarchy, and calls for an alternative
approach to power and order. In contrast, the second sloganeer
harnesses patriotism, attempting to redirect its potency on behalf
of the peace movement by decoupling the nation from the state. In
this essay we analyze the discursive techniques used by PMOs in
their project of creating an alternative understanding of 9-11,
the bombing of Afghanistan,
and the passing of the “Patriot Act.” Overall, we
found that the nine peace groups studied responded to the changed
political landscape facing opposition movements in a post-9/11 United
States by calling on bedrock American themes
to critique the government’s responses.
One area of
discursive engagement was the role of September 11 in testing
our “true character” as
a nation. In a televised address on the War on Terrorism, President
Bush stated, “During the last two months, we have shown the
world America is a great
nation. Americans have responded magnificently, with courage and
caring.” The president went on to equate this “American
character” with the war on terrorism. In contrast, peace
groups claimed that opposing war was most consistent with the true
character of America.
Some of the
organizations counseled that September 11 and the national crises
it unleashed should be
understood as a testing period, a “crucial moment” that
created an opportunity for the U.S. to
rely on its true values and to uphold its most deeply held constitutional
principles. They clearly saw that the definition of what it meant
to be an “American” was being contested. They also
insisted that the stakes were even higher insofar as this was not
just about how peace activists view themselves, but also about
how others view them. For example, WILPF suggested that, “the
people of the world are watching” to see how the U.S. would
respond, and counseled: “Let us demonstrate that our strength
is in our resolve to maintain a democratic and free society and
break the cycle of violence and retribution.” Similarly, Pax
Christi issued statements designed to tap into reservoirs of relatively
benign national pride by consistently calling forth from fellow
citizens “the best of [the] U.S. tradition” and
the “best of who we are.” Pax Christi even drew upon
maternal metaphors to inspire Americans to show their true character
and honor traditional values through their opposition to retaliatory
violence: “Our unspeakable grief and pain has, like a woman
in labor, also given birth to a new sense of unity and has given
the nation an opportunity to show its true character.”
The usage of American identity themes
was strongest in countering the war in Afghanistan.
PMOs constructed a notion of American identity that turned traditionally
nationalistic themes into the service of peace, human rights and
military moderation in the war on terrorism. For instance while
there was broad popular support in the United States for bombing
Afghanistan and the larger effort to hunt for Al Qaeda members,
AFSC, FOR, WILPF and PaxC each flatly rejected equating patriotism
with support for U.S. policies and refused to join in the wave
of blind patriotic nationalism. For example, WILPF writing in
response to the “Patriot Act” and the U.S. intent
to bomb Afghanistan suggested:
We urge our
fellow citizens to at least listen to those who, out of love
of country, dare to say what many
do not wish to hear. Our government, too, has in the past supported
terrorists – including some of the very groups we fear today – and
used the methods of terrorism to unseat democratically elected
governments in the service of our own perceived “national
interest.”
NYLAW harnessed
American identity, proclaiming, “we are proud to be American trade unionists
against the war,” thus linking a traditionally pro-American
image of the “trade unionist” to the anti-war movement.
Harnessing “American identity” thus
redefined patriotism to mean dissent, including dissenting from
a War on Terrorism that, while it may have had a just cause, was
nonetheless being waged in an unjust manner according to FOR. This
was an important alternative in a political context described by
FOR as leading “to an unquestioning patriotism that equates
dissent with unAmericanism.” Protest became defined as a
legitimate means of showing love for country. Pax Christi tried
to turn the tables on those who used patriotism to silence policy
critics when it claimed that the highest form of patriotism is
criticism itself: “There will be those who will try to tell
us that criticizing our national policies in time of crisis is
unpatriotic. But as William Fulbright, the former Senator from
Arkansas reminds us, ‘Criticism is more than right; it is
an act of patriotism, a higher form of patriotism, I believe, than
the familiar ritual of national adulation. All of us have the responsibility
to act upon the higher patriotism which it to love our country
less for what it is than for what we would like it to be.’”
Collective identities
generally involve commitments to common principles. In the case
of nationalism, patriots
uphold the core values that unite the nation. In trying to mobilize
the American public to support the War on Terrorism, President
Bush sought to heighten patriotism by vilifying the enemy as the
antithesis of American values saying: “We value life; the
terrorists ruthlessly destroy it. We value education; the terrorists
do not believe women should be educated or should have health care,
or should leave their homes. We value the right to speak our minds;
for the terrorists, free expression can be grounds for execution.”
Once again peace
groups sought to harness hegemony by associating dissent with
the national principles articulated
by the President. They saw Bush’s policies actually limiting,
rather than upholding traditional American freedoms; they insisted
that the job of the true patriot was to protect the Bill of Rights. The
AFSC enumerated a long list of constitutional rights whose use
would form a bulwark against the new dangers facing the U.S.,
concluding, “Working in your communities to use and protect
these rights in the weeks ahead will guarantee that terrorism has
not destroyed the fabric of liberty or undercut our Constitution”
The point of such statements was not
to engage in remedial civics lessons with a public whose allegiance
to America was clearly
uncontested. Instead, these organizations contested something else— the
actual meaning of national allegiance in a post-9-11 world, where
much is thought to have changed. Recalling what they see as the
original definition of a patriot, they argue that citizens who
want to be true Americans must continue to speak openly, associate
freely, assemble often, dissent freely, and protect their privacy.
As far as the War Resister’s League was concerned, this applied
to members of the armed forces as well: “We encourage members
of the armed forces to consider carefully their own role in a war
which, despite its wide popular support at the moment, is a violation
of our own constitution and of the charter of the United Nations.”
Harnessing hegemony shifts the critical
spotlight, holding power elites accountable to the same values
that they reference to bolster
their legitimacy. The AFSC invoked foundational American principles
to challenge the government’s policies: “The very principles
on which this country was founded do not support the erosion of
civil liberties or the…discrimination of entire groups of
people for individual actions.” WILPF argued that the war
in Afghanistan will not only make Americans less safe in the long
run, but it will also destroy civil liberties and democracy, those
values Americans hold most dear, and which are the United States’ “greatest
gift” to the world.
In addition
to calling for the protection of civil liberties, peace groups
also appealed to Americans’ commitment
to tolerance, social equality and democracy. While addressing the
scapegoating of immigrants of color that the September 11 attacks
had unleashed in the country, FOR asked rhetorically, “Will
we determine to carry out special acts of kindness by reaching
across lines of difference with goodwill and compassion? Will we
seek to overcome evil with good?” The Black Radical Congress
associated anti-racism with true Americanism and with personal
risk-taking on behalf of those threatened: “True anti-racism
may require us to put ourselves at risk physically in order to
defend Arabs and Muslims from unwarranted attacks.”
Putting self at risk on behalf of others became an important touch-point
for rousing nationalism in the post-9/11 America. For
the media, the government, and society in general, those who lost
their lives in the bombings became symbols of a besieged nation. Politicians
and White House spokespersons repeatedly referenced the victims
in association with the administration’s plans for war. In
his first speech after the attacks, President Bush pledged to carry
the police badge of an officer who died at the World Trade Center.
In this charged political context, those who challenged the plans
for a global war on terrorism were not only deemed traitorous to
the nation, but also as callous and unsympathetic to the suffering
of America’s innocent
civilians. This discursive turn of events clearly created unique
challenges for a peace movement already laboring under difficult
conditions. How did the peace movement respond to the use of victims
and heroes of 9/11 to promote militarism and war?
Peace groups began by immediately
making clear their sympathy for the victims. For instance, compassion
and sense of commonality was voiced by WAND: “We are deeply
shaken by the horror inflicted on our country yesterday...Like
the rest of the world, we searched for hope and assurances of the
safety of loved ones. Our deepest sympathy and our prayers are
with the victims, their families, and the emergency response teams.” Within
days peace groups uniformly condemned the attacks, making statements
such as: “The Black Radical Congress (BRC) strongly condemns
the horrific terror attacks which occurred on September
11th, 2001. The brazen murder of countless thousands
of civilians cannot be supported or condoned.” In
the process, peace activists discursively insulated themselves
from allegations of being unpatriotic.
Peace groups also linked themselves to
the heroism of firefighters and police officers who risked and
lost their lives in desperate
efforts to save others. For example, calling the actions of the
emergency workers examples of the country’s “finest
hour,” Pax Christi expanded traditional notions of both heroism
and of nationalism centered on the defeat of opponents on the battlefield
to include heroes who sacrifice to save and protect lives, at the
expense of only themselves:
We have witnessed countless acts of heroic self-sacrifice, love
and compassion for those caught up in this tragedy. A new kind
of American hero has been forged in the sweat and blood of countless
fire fighters, police officers, emergency workers, doctors, nurses
and volunteers who gave all they had, including their lives, for
the sake of others. And in those instances when the ugly face of
racism showed itself, countless numbers of people of faith stood
in the breach and offered protection for our Arab neighbors. In
many respects this has been our finest hour.
This image of the 9/11 hero was further
put forth by Pax Christi as a “parable” by which Americans could live their
lives and conduct their domestic and foreign policy: “preventing
further victims, attending to vulnerable ones, sheltering from
harm…”
The attacks of September 11, 2001 created
a considerable challenge for peace activists seeking to open
space for critical analysis.
As PMOs accommodated the political climate and made use of the
discussions of patriotism to call for peace, the question remained—was
the peace movement better off harnessing hegemony or directly challenging
it? On the one hand, social movements research suggests that during
low ebbs in levels of protest within a society, mass movements
are not likely to form unless organizers can discursively tap into
widely and deeply resonant identities, beliefs, and values. Statements
that directly challenge resonant cultural materials (e.g., that
racism and capitalism constitute the driving forces behind U.S. government
policies) are unlikely to attract participants beyond those already
convinced.
What perhaps has most distinguished
the post-9/11 peace movement in the United
States from its predecessors is the diversity
of its participants. In recent anti-war demonstrations, people
from all walks of life came to their first protest. The U.S. Civil
Rights Movement amply demonstrated that demanding that a state’s
policies truly reflect the principles that underpin its legitimacy
places enormous moral pressure upon the state to respond. We have
also seen evidence that in the post 9/11 context, harnessing hegemony
not only insulated peace activists from censure and repression,
but also has facilitated dialogue. For instance, on one college
campus, towards the end of official hostilities with Iraq,
ROTC cadets and associated fraternities decided to hold a “Proud
to be an American Day.” The event offered both free hot dogs
and live rock music. Sitting in the thick of things, two students
held a poster that simply read, “Peace is Patriotic.” When
asked, neither of the students reported being intimidated or threatened.
Rather they said that several people approached them to discuss
what the war was about and what would happen next.
Those who favor
challenging hegemony argue that the quality of peace activism
matters more than its
quantity. If one assumes that the U.S. political
system is corporate-dominated and, therefore, largely beyond the
influence of ordinary citizens engaged in low-risk activism, then
building a mass movement may be less effective than organizing
a committed cadre of activists willing to incur high personal costs
to raise the costs of war to the state. In addition, one might
wonder whether harnessing hegemony ultimately reproduces existing
power relations. In the context of the peace movement, nationalism
contributes to war by devaluing the lives and rights of those who
are not part of the nation. By feeding into the logic of nationalism,
efforts to reconstruct nationalist identities may be counter-productive. Moreover,
by failing to challenge capitalism, racism, and patriarchy, appeals
to patriotism simply divert attention away from the underlying
sources of militarism, possibly limiting the transformational potential
of social movements.
Proponents of
harnessing hegemony counter that the staple materials of mainstream
political culture are flexible
enough to be combined in ways that offer poignant and systematic
critiques of existing power relations. For instance, the principle
of democracy can be enlisted in cogent critiques of capitalism,
racism, patriarchy, and militarism. Moreover, the love of one’s
nation is not inherently incompatible with respect for and even
identification with others beyond the nation. In fact, some of
the peace groups studied constructed being a “good American” in
terms of cooperation with other states and respect for international
law, enlisting democracy, civil liberties, tolerance, social equality
on behalf of the cause.
Whether challenging
hegemony or harnessing it or combining both strategies will result
in a global shift towards
peace and justice remains an open question solved only by history. But
the resilience of PMOs to adapt to U.S. culture
in the post-9/11 context is both striking and impressive, even
if it did not bring an end to support for military might. What
our data reveals is that in recognizing the shifts in the political
landscape, peace groups in the months following the attacks of
September 11, 2001 sought to create political and cultural space
for opposition to war by avidly claiming ownership of an American
identity and patriotic goals. Each organization we studied condemned
the terrorist attacks, but then used the shift in the American
psyche to invoke a deeper discussion of what it means to be patriotic
and what defines the core of American identity. Truth, social
justice, compassion, democracy, and an unswerving belief in the
need for dissent emerged as the critical characteristics that these
organizations identified as the backbone of being American. Thus
the protection of civil liberties, opposition to unjustified military
retaliation, and the affirmation of U.S. membership
in the world community were for the moment transformed into definably
patriotic acts.
Recommended Readings:
Coles, Roberta. 1998. “Peaceniks and Warmongers’ Framing
Fracas on the Home Front: Dominant and Opposition Discourse Interaction
during the Persian Gulf Crisis.” Sociological Quarterly (39):369-91.
Coy, Patrick G., and Lynne M. Woehrle.
1996. “Constructing
Identity and Oppositional Knowledge: The Framing Practices of Peace
Movement Organizations During the Gulf War.” Sociological
Spectrum (16): 287-327.
Friedman, Debra, and Doung McAdam. 1992. “Collective Identity
and Activism: Networks, Choices, and the Life of a Social Movement.” In
Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (eds.) Frontiers in Social
Movement Theory. New Haven, CT. Yale University Press.
Keen, Sam. 1986. Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile
Imagination. San Francisco: Harper and Row.
Maney, Gregory M., Lynne M. Woehrle, and
Patrick G. Coy. 2003. “Shaping
Opposition to War after 9/11: Resonance and Resistance by Peace
Movement Organizations”. Unpublished paper presented at the
Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association, August
2003.
Mansbridge, Jane. 2001. “The Making of Oppositional Consciousness.” In
Jane Mansbridge and Aldon Morris (eds.) Oppositional Consciousness:
The Subjective Roots of Social Protest. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Smith,
Tom W., Kenneth A. Rasinski, and Marianne Toce. 2001. “American
Rebounds: A National Study of Public Response to the September
11th Terrorist
Attacks.” Chicago: National Opinion Research Center.
Patrick G. Coy is Associate Professor at the Center for Applied
Conflict Management at Kent State University, and the editor of
the annual volume, Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and
Change, Elsevier Science/JAI Press. He is currently developing
a theoretical model of political cooptation and applying it to
the community mediation movement in the U.S.
Gregory M. Maney
is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Hofstra University. He
is currently using time-series event data to analyze the relationship
between ethnic nationalism,
protest, and political violence in Northern
Ireland. His general research and teaching
interests include social movements; peace, war, and social conflict;
race and ethnicity; and development and change.
Lynne M. Woehrle is Assistant Professor
of Sociology in the Department of Behavioral Science and Social
Work at Mount Mary College in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. She is interested in the work that marginalized
communities do to create alternatives to the status quo system. Her
interdisciplinary interests include Feminism, Peace Studies, Conflict
Resolution, and Environmental Sustainability.
To contact the authors:
Patrick Coy: pcoy@kent.Edu
Gregory M. Maney: Gregory.M.Maney@hofstra.edu
Lynne M. Woerhrle: woehrlel@mtmary.edu